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Using preferential trade access to promote global development goals: the case of 
beef and market access to Norway from Namibia and Botswana  
Using market access to achieve developmental aims has long been held as a key 
tenet of global development policy.  Using a case study approach based on 
interviews along and across the beef value chain between Namibia, Botswana, 
and Norway, this article addresses the question of whether market access to high 
value markets for livestock products has developmental benefits.  The costs and 
benefits of using market access for beef products as a developmental policy tool 
are identified and the key role played by international meat traders in both 
upgrading and rent capture discussed. 
Keywords: Market access, preferential trade, beef, Norway, Namibia, Botswana 
1  Introduction 
Market access for livestock products is particularly challenging for developing 
countries. While many developing countries receive duty-free, quota-free access to 
developed markets under a range of preferential tariff arrangements, other non-tariff 
issues come into play for livestock, meat and meat products because they are subject to 
a wide array of strict sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) protocols based on the provision 
of both food safety attributes and the national or regional absence of different animal 
diseases. Whilst most developed country markets are mature, some are quite profitable; 
either due to growing demand, domestic agricultural protection or through high value 
niche market segments.  The loss of these opportunities can be significant (Perry et al. 
2002:50). A further issue is the way that the benefits of market access are shared among 
producers, processors, and traders.  Absence of market access may preclude smallholder 
farmers in particular from moving up the value chain where commercialization is a 
government objective (Perry and Rich, 2007).  To what extent gaining access to these 
high value markets is a positive force for promoting inclusion and upgrading in 
emerging livestock, meat, and meat product suppliers is unclear (Perry et al. 2005:6, 
Perry and Sones, 2007).  These questions provide the foundation for the research. 
Namibia and Botswana are among a small handful of developing countries that have 
obtained market access into a majority of major global beef markets (Scoones et al. 
2008). Of particular relevance has been access to the European common market, 
facilitated by significant investments in biosecurity and animal health to meet strict EU 
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SPS standards (Rich and Perry 2011; Naziri et al. 2015).  Both countries also have 
access to the Norwegian market through a duty-free quota granted under preferential 
trading agreements between Norway and the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU). 
Commonalities in the SPS regimes of the EU and Norway have facilitated this access. 
While economic theory highlights that quotas have the same overall welfare effects in 
importing countries as preferential tariffs, a key difference is that the rents associated 
with quotas accrue to quota holders. Using quotas as a mechanism to foster market 
access between Botswana/Namibia and Norway has not surprisingly politicized the beef 
trade, both domestically in the two African countries and in Norway (see, for example, 
Kaira 2018; Menges 2014; and Mguni 2019). Indeed, these developments have altered 
the political economy of quota administration (see Bates 1981 for a general overview), 
affecting the balance of power among different intermediaries in the beef value chain.  
In recent years, a number of conflicts associated with the administration of the quota 
have surfaced, raising concerns as to whether the quota fulfils its functions of regulating 
beef imports for Norway and pursuing the development objectives of Norway (“trade as 
aid”). The developmental benefits of the quota in Botswana and Namibia are also 
questioned.  
 
The developmental impact of market access for meat products from Namibia and 
Botswana is additionally complicated by the geographical challenges that these 
countries face and their recent political history.  Both countries are extremely arid with 
low and unpredictable rainfall.  Namibia and Botswana have differing post-colonial 
narratives in which human segregation and land use influenced the domestic 
management of market access for livestock to international markets (Hillborn 2013; 
Miescher 2012). 
This paper, based on a series of comprehensive interviews with actors in the value 
chain, provides an overview of trends and developments associated with beef 
production and trade from Botswana/Namibia to Norway. We highlight the role that 
changing industry dynamics have had on the beef trade. We then focus on some of the 
challenges that future trends portend for the sector, including an assessment of different 





The study set itself three key questions: (1) do the attributes necessary for market access 
for meat and meat products shape their value chains in a specific and identifiable way; 
(2) do traders and other intermediaries in value chain influence the benefits to 
producers; and, (3) what lessons can be learned from the experience of the countries and 
actors involved that might guide future policy?  Specifically, the paper reveals how 
market access quotas affect farmer, firm, and policy decisions in Norway, Namibia and 
Botswana.  The market rationales and dynamics in each country and the extent to which 
the quota meets notional developmental objectives are a central reason for undertaking 
the research. We also consider how countries with a heavy dependence on niche 
markets and defined special market access (as is the case in the relationship between 
Botswana, Namibia and Norway) manage the risk of limited market diversification.  
 
Conceptual framework, data and methods 
This paper consists of a case study with a series of embedded units of analysis at 
different levels including country (Namibia, Botswana, UK, and Norway) and actor 
(traders, agents, policymakers, processors, researchers and farmer leaders). 
We define the impact of beneficial market access for beef from Namibia and Botswana 
to international markets as the sum of employment, income, and quality outcomes, and 
hypothesize that these are influenced by a range of factors including social and physical 
infrastructure; access by farmers to export markets; and the various intermediaries that 





We adopt a case study approach based on identification of key informants, multiple 
sources, replication, and prior informed consent to ensure a minimum validity and 
reliability (Yin 2003).  This study uses as its unit of analysis intermediaries in the value 
chain.  Specific themes of enquiry, realms of response associated with the research 
questions, and numbers of embedded case studies (in-depth interviews) for each actor 





[Table 1: conceptual framework] 
Source:  authors 
 
Interviews were conducted against a set of guide questions and in each case prior 
informed consent was received from the interviewees against an agreement for 
anonymity using the University of Greenwich Ethics Policy and Code of Practice for 
Research (UoG 2019).   
2  An overview of the beef sectors of Botswana, Namibia, and Norway 
Cattle production and beef exports dominate the Botswana agricultural sector which 
consists of approximately 77,000 individual farmers, 74,200 of which are communal, 
small-scale, and extensive.   Since independence in 1966 Botswana’s cattle herd has 
remained between 2-3 million head, a figure that reflects the carrying capacity of the 
existing grazing system.  Seleka (2015) shows that the share of communal farms in the 
cattle population has varied between 85% and 97% between 1995 and 2012, and 
suggests that this points to an underlying trend of declining commercial farming but 
new investors in communal cattle rearing.  This trend towards increased communal 
farming is a challenge for productivity and for market access. 
 
Meat exports from Botswana are controlled by the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC), 
a state-run parastatal. BMC maintains both monopsony power over the purchase of 
animals for export and monopoly power on beef exported (Mupotola et al. 1997). A 
historical challenge that BMC faces has been low throughput in its abattoirs, 
compounded by the traditionally low prices (often below export parity) paid to 
producers, reducing their incentives to supply BMC given more attractive prices found 
in domestic markets (Dizyee et al. 2017).  BMC are required to return 70% of their 
income to producers under their Act.  Traditionally, this was done with a bonus 
payment in December, but recent problems have meant no bonuses.  The time it takes 
for farmers to be paid has also increased as BMC has suffered cash-flow challenges.  
Some years ago, farmers were paid within 48 hours of sale (having ‘trekked’ their 
animals to a selling point).  Now it can take up to 14 days to be paid. 
 
Market access for beef exports to major developed markets (USA, EU) necessitates 
freedom from foot-and-mouth disease (FMD). While FMD is typically not fatal for 
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infected animals, it spreads rapidly and causes widespread morbidity. Most high-value 
markets are free of FMD, and mandate that trading partners are also free of the disease 
as a precondition for trade (James and Rushton 2002).  Economic impacts of non-
compliance can be extensive (Knight-Jones & Rushton, 2013).  In the case of Southern 
Africa, exporting countries are further required to maintain disease freedom without 
vaccination (Rich & Winter-Nelson 2007). To ensure market access, Botswana 
maintains different production zones that are certified as FMD-free without vaccination 
by the World Animal Health Organization (OIE) that are physically separated by a 
double-ringed fence (see figure 2). These fences are combined with strict livestock 
identification and traceability protocols that are reported to cost US$35 million to 
establish, and €5 million per year to maintain (Agritrade 2011). Lapses in this system 
during 2011 forced Botswana to shut down exports for six months and to change from a 
stomach bolus based system to ear tags (Moreki et al, 2012).  
 
Cattle production and beef exports also play important roles in the agricultural economy 
of Namibia. Namibia had a cattle herd of approximately 2.38 million head in 2014. An 
important dynamic in the cattle sector in Namibia is the regional bifurcation of cattle 
production systems between the northern and southern parts of the country. Namibia 
maintains strict biosecurity controls in the form of a veterinary cordon fence (VCF) that 
splits the northern part of the country (with predominately smallholder communal 
production) from the southern part of the country where large-scale, export-oriented 
commercial production takes place, as shown in figure 3 (Miescher, 2012). The part of 
Namibia south of the VCF has been recognized as FMD-free without vaccination by the 
OIE, which allows market access to European market. Areas north of the VCF do not 
have access, as they include surveillance zones, areas in which vaccination is required, 
and endemic pockets of FMD (Vosloo et al, 2002). This divergence in market access is 
important to the Namibian government, shaping the price setting process for cattle and 
influencing the investments and regulatory changes proposed to find ways that improve 
the ability of smallholder farmers and the emerging Namibian middle classes with 
larger herds, to access higher-value markets. Approximately one-half of Namibia’s 
livestock are on either side of the fence.  
[Figure 2:  vet disease control zones Botswana] 
Source:  European Commission (2013a) 
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[Figure 3:  vet disease control zones Namibia] 
Source:  European Commission (2013b) 
Commercial offtakes (i.e., sales of cattle for slaughter) typically range between 10-15% 
of national production, though there are wide differences between north and south, and 
communal and commercial production. Nationwide, about 75-80% of production comes 
from commercial producers, while offtakes in the northern communal areas (NCA) are 
about 5% of NCA stocks (Naziri et al. 2015). As illustrated in figure 4, the main 
destinations for live cattle have historically been either for export to South Africa 
(typically weaners from semi-commercial farms south of the VCF) and for slaughter by 
Namibia’s main export-oriented abattoir, Meatco. Exports of meat from northern 
abattoirs are limited and primarily serve regional markets. The export of both live 
animals and meat from northern communal areas to South Africa is restricted by strict 
quarantine rules and since the FMD outbreak in 2015, exports of both animals and meat 
from areas north of the VCF were banned and expensive remedial measures put in place 
(The Namibian, 2015 and New Era, 2016).  
[Figure 4:  Marketed cattle in Namibia by sales 2010-16] 
Source:  Meatco 
Prices for cattle are set by Meatco on a weekly basis based on a grading scheme 
(Meatco, 2018), with animals classified from A (highest grade) to C (lowest). C grade 
animals sell at a 20-30% discount relative to A grade. While animals north of the VCF 
cannot be sold for export to high-value markets, Meatco maintains the same pricing 
scheme for animals sourced north and south of the VCF. This provides an implicit 
subsidy for producers in the NCA, even though most animals in communal areas would 
be C grade. Meatco has historically operated at a loss in its NCA abattoirs and mobile 
slaughter facilities, both on the basis of its pricing scheme and low throughput (Naziri et 
al. 2015). The obligation for Meatco to buy may result in a transfer of export value from 
animals south of the red line to animals in the north.  This is a long held argument for 
maintaining Meatco’s status in Namibia, but has been hard to prove. 
Figure 5 illustrates the evolution of carcass prices (Namibia dollars per kg) during 2010-
18. Prices for producers have been rising since 2010, in recent years aided by the 
currency weakness, with price spikes in recent years due to drought.   
[Figure 5:  Carcass prices for Namibian beef 2010-18] 
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Source:  MeatCo 
 
The domestic beef sector in Norway has been in a slow decline. Current domestic 
production is around 82,000 tons, falling from about 95,000 tons in 1999, while 
consumption was, until recently, steadily rising to around 95,000 -100,000 tons (Rich et 
al. 2012). Consumption per capita has been declining slowly since 2000. Imports fill in 
the gap between supply and demand, with the majority of imports from the EU under 
supplemental quotas administered by the Norwegian Agricultural Agency (SLF). 
Another 3,700 tons of beef comes from SACU under different quotas described in the 
next section. According to unpublished data from Nortura, an agricultural cooperative 
and the largest processor of meat in Norway, the market for premium cuts in Norway is 
around 14,400 tons. Imports from SACU comprise 22% of this market, and 13% of the 
highest end steak/filet ‘prime cuts’ market.  
 
A development over the past years has been involvement of Nortura more directly 
within the beef trade in Norway. Nortura’s interest in trade with SACU countries has 
been motivated by its desire to facilitate imports in a manner not disruptive to the 
domestic market and as a form of corporate social responsibility to improve beef 
production in Botswana and Namibia. Nortura began importing small amounts of beef 
directly in 2009, and bought its way into the market through the purchase of an equity 
share in one of Namibian’s few certified export-oriented abattoirs, Witvlei. The Witvlei 
abattoir was originally set up as an empowerment business by the Government of 
Namibia with a view to eventually breaking up the export monopoly of MeatCo.   
Since 2014, when trade with Witvlei stopped, Nortura has traded directly with Global 
Proteins Solutions Group (GPS), a UK-based meat broker that plays a critical role in the 
beef trade between SACU and Norway. GPS plays an important intermediary role 
between MeatCo, BMC, and retailers, providing technical support in production, 
logistics, and marketing for the purposes of adding value to Namibian and Botswanan 
beef. GPS acts as a service provider on a fee-basis and not as a traditional wholesaler or 
trader as such.  In 2013, Nortura, through its relationship with GPS, imported about 
47% of beef from SACU.  
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3  Trade dynamics and trends of beef exports from Botswana and Namibia to 
Norway 
Meat exports to Norway are regulated through two sets of market access quotas. First, 
the free trade agreement between SACU and Norway allows for a 500-ton duty-free 
quota from exports from SACU countries (Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, South Africa, 
Swaziland) to Norway. Second, Botswana and Namibia co-administer a World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) General System of Preferences (GSP) duty-free quota of 2,700 
tons that is a vestige from the previous preferential trade regime Norway maintained 
with developing countries, with each country receiving one-half of the quota based on 
negotiations between Meatco and BMC (Rich et al. 2012; Aurdal & Omholt 2013).  
In figure 6, we illustrate trends in beef imports from the three SACU countries to 
Norway from 2011-18. Namibia has largely filled its quota of 1,600 tons in each of the 
five years, and was able to have Botswana’s quota reallocated to Namibia in 2011 and 
2012 when Botswana’s trade was disrupted by FMD. An important development in beef 
exports from SACU has been the shift away from frozen products towards fresh 
offerings, and towards higher-value cuts. In figure 6, the price of fresh beef cuts is given 
on the secondary axis (line graphs), highlighting the steady rise in the price of fresh beef 
achieved by Botswana and Namibia. In figure 7, we likewise observe a strong rise in the 
share of fresh beef exported to Norway, where the share of fresh beef from Botswana 
and Namibia reached 88% in 2016. This has since levelled off, while in Swaziland, the 
sharp reduction in 2018 was due to the FMD-related export ban imposed by the EU.  
[Figure 6: Exports of beef from SACU countries to Norway 2011-18] 
Source: Statistisk sentralbyrå (Statistics Norway) 
[Figure 7:  Share of fresh beef imports from SACU 2011-18] 
Source: Statistisk sentralbyrå (Statistics Norway) 
An important distinction between these quotas concerns their administration. The 500 
ton SACU quota, which is predominately shared between Namibia and Botswana, is 
allocated by means of an auction system, whereby once per year, Norwegian traders bid 
for a share of the quota (Aurdal and Omholt 2013). The gap between high and low bids 
tends to be relatively small, with bids ranging from a low of 0.01 NOK/kg in 2008 to a 
high of around 16 NOK/kg in 2010, with these relatively low quota bids (relative to the 
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value of these quota rents) reflecting in part a lack of competition amongst a limited 
number of auction participants (ibid.). The GSP quota, by contrast, is allocated through 
a licensing mechanism administered in each country. In Botswana, only the BMC has 
quota rights, whereas in Namibia, the government allocates the quota to export-oriented 
abattoirs. The licensing of the GSP quota replaced the previous first-come, first-serve 
(FCFS) means of quota allocation in 2011, which had been problematic in that the quota 
would literally fill within minutes of its opening on the 1st of January each year (Rich et 
al. 2012). 
The GSP quota has come under scrutiny as to its WTO legality (Rich et al. 2012). To be 
compliant, the preferential access that both countries receive would need to be 
subsumed under a free-trade agreement such as SACU. This is currently under 
discussion. It is not yet clear whether the expanded SACU quota (that would 
incorporate the GSP quota) will be administered as an auction or under license. 
Discussions with sources in the Namibian industry and government, as well as with 
GPS revealed that all strongly favour retaining the license mechanism. One source 
remarked that reverting to an auction would damage the branding and promotion 
investments that have been made to add value to Namibian beef, as there would not be 
the scale necessary to make such efforts cost-effective. GPS also note the increase in 
value-added products found in Norwegian supermarkets which has coincided with the 
movement away from traditional traders and towards a service provision arrangement. 
On the other hand, discussions with a beef trader suggest that the lack of competition 
implicit in the licensing program has reduced incentives for market and product 
diversification outside of the Norwegian market.  
4  How quotas influence farmer, firm and policy decisions  
What role has GSP quotas played in generating rent-seeking behaviour, and how these 
rents are distributed? An important aspect of the narrative revolves around how business 
dynamics in the meat sector have been influenced by trade with Norway, specifically in 
terms of (a) the allocation of quota rights internally with Namibia and (b) how the 
marketing of meat has evolved in response. 
Arrangements on the licensing of the main GSP quota in Namibia have prompted 
significant rent-seeking behaviour amongst local abattoirs and Norwegian interests. In 
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2011, when the quota was first allocated internally, it was distributed evenly between 
MeatCo, a government parastatal / producer-run cooperative, and Witvlei, a private 
abattoir. Witvlei was established in 1998 and run under a lease agreement with the 
Agribank, by one of Namibian’s richest entrepreneurs with close ties to the Namibian 
government (New Era 2016a). The abattoir was constructed in a remote part of eastern 
Namibia. MeatCo historically produces about 80 percent of Namibia’s export-oriented 
meat and had strongly argued for an allocation of the quota more in line with the current 
and historical trends of production.  
Witvlei was 30% owned by Nortura, a large producer-owned cooperative in Norway 
which also plays a parallel role as the market regulator there (Aurdal & Omhalt 2013). 
Previously, Witvlei had been part of a partnership between two other Norwegian trading 
houses, but this broke down over a price dispute (Rich et al. 2012). Nortura’s stated aim 
was development-oriented in bringing Namibian prices up to near-Norwegian levels, 
although previous discussions of this have suggested that this was a means to capture 
margins previously held by importers (Rich et al. 2012).  
Namibia’s Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) stepped in to litigate the dispute 
between MeatCo and Witvlei. In 2014, the quota was reallocated such that MeatCo 
obtained 1,200 tons, Witvlei 300 tons, and Brukarros Meat Processors (BMP) 100 tons; 
the BMP quota was eventually re-allocated 50:50 when it emerged it could not meet 
export standards (Schlechter 2014). Witvlei ceased operations later in 2014, with 
Nortura resigning from the board and engaged in a dispute with meat owed to it by 
Witvlei (Vermes 2015). As of December 2015, Witvlei was in receivership, with its 
abattoir owned by Agribank, a government-owned bank (New Era 2016b) . In April 
2016, Witvlei won its court case against Agribank and regained access to its abattoir. 
Trading dynamics and the rents generated by trade between Namibia and Europe have 
been transformed by the entry of GPS, a UK-based service provider, as the main broker 
for exports. GPS have worked with Namibia since 2008 and Botswana since 2012. An 
important difference in their approach compared to past trading efforts has been on 
altering the product mix from predominantly frozen cuts to fresh cuts and on marketing.  
This has led to strong price gains, with returns increasing 132% in Namibia and 65% in 
Botswana since GPS began its involvement. Brand-building has been taking place in 
Namibia with respect to their premium “Nature’s Reserve” brand. Unlike Namibia, 
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Botswana has not developed a farm level standard, but intends to in the near future.  By 
having a farm assurance scheme, Botswana will be able to brand their products in high 
value markets in the same way the Namibia sells its product in, for example, Denmark 
under the “Natures Reserve” label (Natures Reserve 2019).  
However, much of the branding efforts with Nature’s Reserve have focused on the 
European (non-Norwegian) market, despite obtaining significantly higher price 
premiums in Norway (see Box 1).  By differentiating between different meat grades and 
cuts in the final markets (notably the relative insensitivity of the Norwegian consumer 
to beef quality factors prevalent in more competitive markets such as the UK), this firm 
seems to be capturing lead firm rents beyond the value of its upgrading efforts (as 
predicted by Trienekens 2011).   
 
[Box 1:  How Norway’s indifference to beef quality allows Traders to profit] 
Source:  various interviews 
GPS sit in a network of business arrangements among the meat industries of Southern 
Africa, the United Kingdom and Norway.  This web of ownership presents a challenge 
for policy makers who seek foreign investment, but who also want fair and inclusive 
domestic and international meat trading arrangements that engage all scales of 
production including the very small scale.  The estimation of quota rents associated with 
the GSP and SACU quotas sheds some light onto these issues, although data limitations 
preclude a more rigorous discussion. In table 2, we update the analysis from Aurdal & 
Omholt (2013) by computing estimated quota rents for Namibia (data was not available 
for Botswana) during 2010-18, based on prevailing farm prices (in carcass equivalent) 
in Namibia, export unit values for fresh beef, and estimates for wholesale prices of meat 
cuts in Norway. Quota rents are calculated by Aurdal and Omholt as the surplus 
exporters and importers receive net of the price paid for the product. For exporters, 
these rents are the difference between the price received and the farm price. For 
importers, these rents are the difference between the wholesale price and the sum of the 
exporter price, transport costs, and (where relevant) auction costs associated with the 
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SACU quota.1 The percentage change in these surpluses can be compared to prices 
farmers received from trade with Norway to glean the degree to which certain value 
chain actors gain more or less from this trade.  Aurdal & Omholt (2013) estimated 
wholesale meat prices at 183 NOK/kg for their entire data sample (2008-12), which is 
plausible given that domestic meat prices were largely unchanged from 2009-12 based 
on the CPI for beef and veal reported by SSB (Norwegian Statistical Service). However, 
from 2013, the prices for beef and veal rose by about 5% per year and we have updated 
wholesale prices accordingly. 
[Table 2:  Distribution of quota rents in Namibia 2010-18] 
Source and notes:  Sources and notes: Aurdal and Omholt (2013) for exporter, 
transporter, importer, and Norwegian government figures from 2010-2012 and method. 
Farmer prices for 2010-2018 from MeatCo (see figure 4) and converted to NOK from 
annual exchange rate figures of SSB; slight discrepancies can be found between our 
2010-2012 figures and those of Aurdal and Omholt (2013). Exporter figures from 2013-
2018 from SSB.  Norwegian auction revenue figures from Landbruksdirektoratet, 
retrieved from http://auksjon.landbruksdirektoratet.no/history. Importer figures adjust 
the 183 NOK/kg figure from Aurdal and Omholt (2013) for 2013-2018 based on CPI 
figures from SSB for beef and veal. Original importer figure is used for 2010-2012. 
GSP refers to preferential quota for Botswana and Namibia; SACU refers to the auction 
used for the Norway-SACU FTA. 
The results in table 2 are quite illuminating. From 2010, we observe a nominal doubling 
in the exporter surplus in Norwegian Kroner (NOK) terms during 2010-18. This reflects 
in large part the movement towards higher-value fresh cuts as facilitated by GPS. At the 
                                                 
1 It is worth noting Aurdal & Omholt (2013) directly compare carcass prices with those of cuts 
in their analysis, which is problematic given the greater transformation associated with cuts. 




same time, up until 2016 producer prices in nominal Namibian dollar terms had 
increased by about 51% (recall figure 4), while in NOK terms, farm prices have been 
largely flat in trend owing to the steady depreciation of the Namibian dollar. This trend 
showed a sharp rise upwards in 2017-2018 in part due to drought-induced pricing 
pressures. This implies the generation of significant, supra-normal rents by the new 
trading arrangements, and ones whose developmental benefits (i.e., at the farm level) 
are instead captured in part by these new trading arrangements. Taking the anecdotal 
information from box 1 into account suggests these rents net of costs are substantial, 
though there is some indication that more premium and higher quality meats are being 
sold in Norway in recent times.  
By contrast, table 1 suggests that surpluses at the importer level have been steady to 
declining since 2011. Auction rates – revenue for the Norwegian government – on a 
per-kg basis for the 500 ton SACU auction have been steadily rising to a high of 15.81 
NOK/kg in 2016, then falling again in 2017-2018. As these are also increasing as a 
share of the export price, they imply both an increase due to the import of higher-value 
product and higher competition for a smaller pool of available meat by traders.  
An important implication of the analysis of quota rents is the extent to which such 
profits have been used for the benefit Namibia and Botswana actors. It is certainly true 
that there have been significant investments in brand building and differentiation, and 
these have indeed added value in the beef sector. On the other hand, it is equally 
important to ask whether the monopsony buyer (MeatCo/BMC), monopoly marketer 
(GPS) hampers competition and innovation, and reduces the potential benefits to 
farmers. Another consideration is whether the Norwegian meat sector itself wants more 
competition with its own production. Given Nortura’s role in this trade arrangement, 
this could stymie the potential ceiling for Namibian and Botswanan value-adding 
efforts.   An alternative view to this upgrading through product differentiation, offered 
by international meat traders interviewed, was that the value addition was rather limited 
and that more could be achieved through promoting competition among traders for the 
Botswanan and Namibian access to the high value Norwegian market.  However, we 
would argue that in the absence of scale efficiencies, differentiation and value addition 
are the only game in town, although the managed value chain highlighted here may 
place a ceiling on those potential gains. 
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While the analysis in the preceding section has focused on the effects at the level of the 
producer and downstream in the value chain, it is worth considering the implications of 
such quota arrangements on the consumer, particularly in Namibia and Botswana, as 
well as in regional markets in Africa.  In principle, the existence of high-value markets 
in Norway for high-value cuts ostensibly provides greater pricing flexibility of lower-
value cuts to domestic consumers, and potentially benefitting consumers, particularly 
lower-income groups. Indeed, the lack of product differentiation stymies the 
competitiveness of domestic beef production in other parts of Africa (e.g., in West 
Africa), while countries in South America are able to competitively segment markets 
and diversify sales. On the other hand, these benefits are mitigated somewhat by the 
over-reliance of Namibia and Botswana on the Norwegian market, raising the domestic 
price of animals over which would exist in the absence of the quota and making such 
price differentiation vis-à-vis other competitors more difficult.  
5  Quota management – how far is the benefit shared? 
Limited market access is commonly managed through the distribution of quotas.  Small 
quotas represent a particular trade problem:  how do you share the quota equitably and 
transparently without dispersing the volume so much that trade is no longer feasible.  
The most efficient system would be to offer a temporary monopoly, but this would 
focus rents and lead to governments being accused of favouritism.  There is also a risk 
that firms can buy up quota and then fail to use it to take the commercial advantage over 
a rival. 
Quota auctions are often the solution.  This has been the method used at the Norwegian 
end of the Southern African beef trade and continues to be used for the SACU quota.  
Among service providers, the Norwegian auction is strongly disliked because it is 
believed to narrow market access and impede branding and value-adding efforts.  
However, from the point of view of good order, it would seem preferable to the highly 
suspect licensing system used previous to 2011. 
On the supply side, Botswana gives its quota to BMC.  Namibia has used the quota 
differently with the aim of giving advantage to new entrants.  In 2014 when the 
Government of Namibia split the quota between three different abattoirs (Meatco, 
Witvlei and Brukarros abattoirs) it did not work perfectly.  The aim had been to use 
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quota to empower new, largely Government guaranteed, meat-processing investments 
that satisfied a more overt set of policies to re-balance the agricultural economy in 
Namibia in favour of the previously disadvantaged.  This had several snags: firstly, 
Meatco complained that it lost profitable quota, but was still obliged to maintain its loss 
making abattoirs to the North of the VCF; secondly, Witvlei failed to meet its financial 
obligations and shut-down after quota was allocated; and, finally, Brukarros, won quota 
but could not deliver, so returned its quota to Meatco.  In Namibia quotas seem to be the 
only alternative to the damaging dash to grab licenses that used to occur among 
exporters, but is far from a precise policy instrument.  In Norway, quotas have 
facilitated an orderly trade.  However, because the benefit has largely fallen in 
commercial farming areas, the development impact is less clear and harder to quantify.  
The dynamics of quota rents in the Namibian and Botswanan cases are shaped by 
interactions of value chain governance and nature of agricultural protection in Norway. 
Most food exports are characterized by what Gereffi (1999) terms “buyer-led” chains 
that are coordinated by retailers, with standards and codes of conduct transmitted 
upstream to suppliers and intermediaries. This phenomenon has been strengthened by 
the consolidation of retail chains that has occurred across the developed world (Lee et 
al. 2012), and in Norway itself (Amilien et al. 2007). At the same time, despite the 
presence of niches and strong associations with local food (see Nygård & Storstad 1998; 
Amilien et al. 2007), our observation is that the consolidation of retail in Norway has 
had less influence on shaping or transmitting consumer sovereignty outside of this space 
given the nature of agricultural protection and dominance of cooperatives and large 
firms that benefit from the protected market (e.g., Tine, Gilde). This provides a means 
for more of the rents associated with quota to be captured by intermediaries and not 
distributed in the form of branding or other value-adding efforts to benefit consumers. 
Indeed, as noted in the box above, that service providers like GPS can (and do) market 
C-quality meat at A-quality prices in the Norwegian market, and that (until recently) the 
majority of Namibian and Botswanan meat was either sold for food service or as low-
end, private label, limits producers and consumers returns (market and intrinsic). Even 
with growing supermarket and high-value branded sales, there are some questions as to 
the extent that Namibian or Botswanan beef can out-compete local production – recall, 
that Nortura is the largest producer cooperative in Norway and has an interest in 
managing trade and competition. In Denmark, where agricultural protection is lower 
16 
 
than in Norway and where retailers have more power in the chain, we observe that 
successful access to the Danish market by Namibia and Botswana come from strong 
branding efforts through “Nature’s Reserve”, which in addition to strong competition in 
general in such markets, invariably reduce the already smaller quota rents available 
from EU quota preferences. Such efforts are notably absent in Norway, and unlikely to 
be deemed necessary or desired, particularly given the involvement of the Norwegian 
meat industry itself in the management of SACU beef quotas.  
6  The challenge of competitiveness 
Previous research detailed the negative impact that preferential quotas have had on the 
overall competitiveness of Botswana and Namibia in global beef markets (Rich & Perry 
2011; Naziri et al. 2015). Indeed, one of Nortura’s stated aims with their involvement in 
the SACU beef sector is to eventually bring beef prices in both countries to 85- 90% of 
Norwegian levels, and indeed the analysis in section 4 highlights the steady upward 
movement in Namibian beef prices in particular. Given that agricultural protection in 
Norway affords local Norwegian producers among the highest prices for beef in the 
world, this potentially has two important effects.  
First, it increases the reliance of Botswana and Namibia on the Norwegian markets as a 
means of keeping farm prices high. On a product basis, UN Comtrade data reveal that 
Namibia exports around 25,000 tons of beef per year, of which 9,000-10,000 tons each 
go to the European Union and South Africa, and just under 2,000 tons to Norway. As 
prices for Namibian beef sold regionally is less than the producer price for beef, rising 
prices for producers depend on continued access to high-priced European markets. 
MeatCo continues to lose money on its operations, primarily through cross-
subsidization of abattoirs in the NCA and paying standard prices for cattle nationwide. 
While this indirectly benefits smallholder producers in the NCA and represents a 
positive development impact, it exposes both countries to various shocks largely out of 
their control. For instance, a significant outbreak of FMD in each country’s FMD-free 
zone or other violation of SPS protocols would wipe out the industry.  
Second, high prices for beef from Botswana and Namibia increase the difficulty that 
both countries could have in diversifying their markets, particularly from communal 
areas.  Interviewed traders all seem to agree that there is potential for export to China 
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and the Middle East, mainly for lower value cuts, through margins will certainly not 
match those currently available. GRN are making efforts to gain market access to new 
market areas, but the challenge for many of these markets is that they will be highly 
competitive at the low quality, where prices are low and volumes high.  Given 
Namibia’s inability to develop sufficient volumes relative to competitors in these 
markets (Brazil, Australia), this is not a market space that it should consider. 
Is it worthwhile Namibia expending its effort in Norway to build a brand for its 
products when supply and demand are finite?  Interviewed traders describe the 
Norwegian meat market as ‘nationalistic’ suggesting that branding could be 
counterproductive in that the market for such products may have a hard ceiling relative 
to locally produced meat. Namibia’s Nature’s Reserve Brand has only started to make 
inroads in premium Norwegian retail venues in the recent past. More success has been 
achieved with Nature’s Reserve in Denmark (Coop 2014, 22-43).   
 
7  Conclusions 
There remain a degree of risk and uncertain in beef production and trade from Botswana 
and Namibia.  Value chain actors were asked to assess the production and market 
landscape for the region should market access decline from its current levels and 
cost/productivity factors remain constant. 
Namibia is left with rather limited options for market access for its Northern communal 
areas.  Third countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have good prices, 
but poor trading practices and uncertain demand make investments in these markets 
risky. The Namibian government (GRN) has set up a Market Diversification 
Committee, recognising the risks inherent in its current reliance on the Norway.  
Negotiations for SPS Agreement with China and Russia are on-going and a private 
study of the Chinese market for Namibian beef was conducted in 2012 (Min. of Ag, 
Water and Fisheries, pers comms).  
In Namibia, several stakeholders talked about the possibility of domestic value addition.  
A canning plant is planned in Zambezi Region, as a way to get around the particular 
problems of an area with disease management challenges. The economics of such an 
operation are unclear.  A long held desire to increase the value addition to leather has 
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yet to materialise.   For some years now, GRN has been pushing for a reduction in the 
export of live animals from Namibia to promote domestic value addition and this has 
led to some investment in abattoir capacity, particularly for small stock.   
The primary strategy for Botswana is to maximise the FMD free area in the country.  To 
do this they will invest in a new zonal approach, adopt a new traceability system based 
on a double ear tag and propose experimentation with forms of Commodity Based 
Trade (CBT).  Full national FMD free coverage is always going to be a problem in areas 
with buffalo populations. CBT is probably the only solution for this type of area. 
All informants in Botswana talked about the growth of informal/local/domestic meat 
processing.  Those in the formal sector claimed that this type of market is unreliable and 
unable to take large numbers of animals.  BMC would like to implement a national farm 
assurance scheme and plan to raise all domestic production to export standard.  With 
existing cannery facilities for corned beef (90% beef), corned meat (45% beef) and pet 
food for export to South Africa, they plan a new cannery with EU compliance in the 
Ghanzi area in the near future.  
The recent experiences of Namibian and Botswana in exporting to Norway are 
illustrative of a number of potential costs and benefits of using defined market access as 
a development policy tool.  There is clear evidence that both countries have benefited 
financially from market access.  However, the key questions are: did the market access 
provided by Norway deliver wider policy and social impacts desired, who benefits from 
the quota, what would happen if the market access were to disappear, and what lessons 
might be learned that could improve the beneficial impact of market access in Namibia 
and Botswana, and in other countries in future. 
In both countries, market access to high value markets has resulted in investment in 
infrastructure and capacity to meet international food safety and animal health standards 
that would not have otherwise existed.  Namibia and Botswana are rightly proud of their 
exports of beef because they demonstrate a hard-won ability to trade in agricultural 
produce to the highest global standards.  This reputational benefit should not be under-
estimated. 
The wider developmental impacts of market access are harder to measure.  Market 
access has brought some (unmeasured and unascribed) employment and, to some extent, 
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investment in infrastructure, though we have found that some of the impacts of this 
investment are distorting and can lead to rent capture at the level of the larger producer 
and particularly the main service provider/broker and actors downstream.  Efforts in 
both countries to use market access to redress previous imbalances in the structure of 
rural economies cannot be said to have yet fully achieved their aims.  The converse is 
also true, that, without this access and investment, the contribution of livestock to these 
economies would be considerably lower.   
In both countries, continued competitiveness on global markets is still the defining 
question in this debate. Addressing costs through greater efficiency and novel 
compliance methods (e.g., CBT) are possible ways forward.  Value-adding and 
branding efforts are critical to this, but reliance on the highly protected and parochial 
Norwegian market stymied innovation. Clearly, sufficient quota rents in aggregate exist 
to find ways to add value to products sold in Norway to the benefit of producers (and 
conceivably, consumers), but this will require greater awareness and participation of 
producers. In Namibia, the democratization of Meatco’s governance structure towards 
functioning as a producer cooperative may facilitate such an outlook, whether the 
Norwegian market itself is moot.  
On the question of guiding future policy, we believe that our conceptual framework 
provides a potential starting point for a more robust empirical analysis of the trade-offs 
that might occur under different policy scenarios.  This issue of how gains from trade 
are captured and what the real benefits of trade might be needs further analysis.  For 
example, impacts on employment and equity were hard to address in this type of 
qualitative analysis and would benefit from more quantification.  Rigorous 
benchmarking of key indicators such as these followed by review should be part of the 
trade development process and dialogue between trading states to ensure the expected 
results are achieved.   
The case study illustrates the importance of cut level analysis for policy makers.  
Traditional measures of benefits and costs in analysis of policy options in the beef trade 
have tended to be at a carcass level.  Interviews with traders and service providers 
shows clearly that the contribution of profit from a carcass varies with the traders ability 
to differentiate cuts and select the final markets that pay the most for those cuts.  The 




The consolidation of the regional beef export sector in Southern Africa behind an 
individual meat trader (GPS) as facilitated by quota rents is itself an interesting case 
study.  Namibia and Botswana face important efficiency and scale disadvantages in 
international trade.  Might it, therefore, be to their advantage to unify behind a single 
trade partner and a limited number of Norwegian traders?  The cost of entry and the 
scale of benefits is probably low by international standards. The lesson for both 
countries, and others in the same position, would seem to be that balance can be 
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